the Battle of Agincourt

What can we learn from the Battle of Agincourt

Courage and perseverance have a magical talisman, before which    difficulties disappear and obstacles vanish into air. – John Quincy Adams

Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win.  - SunTtzu


         The morning of 25 October, 1415 dawned over Agincourt, France as a cold and dismal morning.  The approximately 6,000 men of the English Army were cold, wet, hungry, and in most cases sick.  They had been on the march for almost three weeks and had covered about 260 miles.  A French Army of approximately 25,000 men blocked their path.  As they looked across the field it now appeared that they were going to die.1

         The Battle of Agincourt, one of many battles fought in what has become to be known as the hundred year’s war, was a minor battle without any real strategic impact.  But what it lacked in strategic impact it more than made up for in elevating the morale of all of England.  King Henry was in France attempting to exercise his sovereignty over lands that he believed were his, lands that his predecessors had lost to the French.  Originally Henry had planned to capture a port to use as a base of operations for further campaigning against Paris, but circumstances had prevented this.  King Henry then changed his plans to conduct a “reconnaissance in force” to enforce his claim that he was operating in “his” territory and to undermine French political authority in the area.  Because he felt he was operating in his own territory he forbade his troops from treating the local citizenry as a hostile population. Henry laid down his campaign ordinances and enforced them fairly and ruthlessly.  Pillaging and all the other (by modern standards) excesses that normally accompanied a medieval campaign were outlawed.  After capturing the port of Harfleur, King Henry and the rest of his Army (he left a garrison in Harfleur) set out for the port of Calais.  The distance was approximately 100 miles and the Army carried enough provisions for a week.  The Kings plan began to unravel when he reached the Somme river and found the far side of the ford there guarded by 6,000 French soldiers.  With no place to cross and unable to close with his enemy King Henry decided to turn upstream and find another place to cross.  Unfortunately for King Henry the French were meticulous in destroying bridges and laying obstacles and guards at all the major crossing sites.  In addition the French had executed a “scorched earth” policy to prevent Henry’s Army from resuppling itself from the countryside.  The further upstream the Amy traveled, the further it moved from its ultimate goal and salvation.  Forced to live on berries and what game could be hunted on the march, the Army grew hungry and sick.

         Finally on the 18th the Army found an unguarded ford and a repairable bridge and crossed the Somme virtually unopposed.  The way seemed clear until the 23rd when the King’s scouts reported that the French Army was 3 miles to the right.  The English deployed for battle and the French closed but no battle took place.    On the 24th the English set out for Calais but, Henry was informed that the French Army was astride his route and a battle could no longer be avoided.

On the morning of the 25th the English Army was roused early from their sleep and formed for battle.  As mentioned earlier, the English were outnumbered and defeat and death appeared certain.  The chaplains in the English Army made their rounds and said mass and heard confessions (there were about 29 chaplains and other religious men in the English Army).  As was the custom then the men-at-arms (knights) were divided into three tactical groups; the vanguard, the main and the rear guard.  These were arranged side-by-side.  On either flank the King arranged his archers.  Additionally the archers had an obstacle emplaced in front of them to strengthen their position.  About a week before the battle King Henry had ordered his archers (compromising almost 4/5ths of his army) to construct and carry a sharpened wooden stake, approximately 6 foot in length and thick enough not to break when impacted by a warhorse2.  These were then emplaced with the sharpened point aimed at the French about waist height.  These were intended as an obstacle to prevent the mounted knights of the French Army from riding down the lightly armed and armored archers and outflanking and overwhelming the men-at-arms.  It was not an original idea.  The Scots had used long spears to defeat English cavalry at the Battles of Falkirk (1298) and Bannockburn (1314), but it showed the depth of Henry’s military training, knowledge and improvisational skills.  The terrain was chosen by the French but on the day of battle they left the initiative to Henry.  With their massive Army they felt, correctly, that Henry had to chase them off the field to win. 

The terrain the French choose for this fight at first glance appeared to be advantageous to the French.  The French set their camp up on the north end of a long plowed field.  This field was between the villages of Agincourt and Tramecourt.  The French camp was north of the road connecting the two villages.  This gave the French plenty of room for their encampment and the field could be used to exercise the horses during the long cold night.  The field was border on the left and right by roads bounded by thick wood lines.  While these were not an obstacle to the archers they prevented a flank attack by the English knights.  The field chosen for the battle was freshly plowed field of winter wheat.  The field was soaked from a rain storm the previous evening.  The French had a large contingent of mounted knights (approximately 2,400 men) and the terrain appeared to facilitate the use of mounted forces. 

At first glance the despair of the English soldiers seems justified, but there are problems.  The French had assembled an Army of approximately 25,000 soldiers.  The field chosen for battle did not provide enough space to maneuver such a large force.  The ground in front of the French camp (between the French and English positions) had been churned up by the knight’s servants walking the horses to prevent them from cramping up in the chill of the night.  Additionally the woods that protected the French flanks not only protected the English flanks but provided concealment for the English archers.  The French also had another problem, that of an ineffective chain of command.  The French King had appointed 2 members of his royal household to command the Army, but they had no authority over the members of the nobility who organized and commanded their own units which comprised the French Army.

The French realized the deadly effectiveness of the English longbows and came up with an effective and efficient battle plan.  The French plan was to divide their archers, crossbowmen, and mounted knights into left flank and right flank units.  The plan called for the 800 mounted men on the right flank and 1,600 mounted men on the left flank and the archers and crossbowmen divided equally.  The archers and crossbowmen would fix the English archers with their fire. As the English archers were involved in the firefight the French mounted units would attack the right flank and encircle to the rear and attack.  This mounted attack was to be coordinated with the dismounted units so that the English were attacked front and rear simultaneously.

The English initially deployed for battle approximately 1,000 yards from the French position.  The English waited about three hours but the French refused to attack.  The English then carefully moved forward until they were at the maximum effective range of there bows (250 to 300 yards) from the French.  When the English army had redeployed, to include the emplacement of the stakes, the archers opened fire2.  The French now found themselves at a disadvantage.  While the French were armed with crossbows and archers these were in no position to respond.  During the wait the nobles had pushed the (socially inferior) archers out of position. The nobles were eager to fight but undisciplined.  Each noble was concerned with his personal glory and had decided himself were he would be in the battle formation.  This lack of discipline not only disrupted the battle formation, it would have dire consequences on the French battle plan.  With the archers and crossbowman no longer in position the French were unable to respond to the English fire.  The French nobility that was assigned to the mounted units showed a lack of discipline as well by wandering away from there assigned positions during the long wait.  This left the mounted units undermanned.  The French Up until this point had surrendered the initiative to the English.

The French then initiated a cavalry charge.  Because the French had permitted the English to redeploy unmolested the English flanks were now securely anchored in the woods.  There was no avenue of approach available to allow the mounted units to go around a flank and attack in the rear.  The mounted unit attack doesn’t seem to have been coordinated with the dismounted attack.  The dismounted element was divided into 3 linear formations.  When the mounted unit started their attack only the first line advanced. The mounted attacks were not only undermanned but not carried through determination and vigor.  The mounted men were discouraged by the accurate and effective fire of the archers and the stakes that the archers had placed in front of their positions.  The ground, as has been noted earlier had been churned up during the night and this attack churned the field up even further.  At this point the dismounted unit began to move.  The going was tough as their sabatons, the armored foot gear that the knights wore, was sucked into the churned up mud.  This required great effort on the armored men to take each and every step and all while under the fire of the archers.  To compound the dismounted men’s problem the woods on either side of the field channeled the retreating mounted men into the ranks of the dismounted men.  The archers fire wounding and terrifying the horses so that they crashed into the dismounted men as they tried to escape.  This disrupted the cohesion of the attack, knocking down some of the dismounted men causing further exertions as they attempted to disengage themselves from the seemingly adhesive mud. 

As the dismounted men closed with the English line the archers fire became more effective and began penetrating the knight’s armor.  In consequence the dismounted men shied away from the archers causing their formation to compact as it advanced.  When the French finally closed with the English dismounted knights their formation was so tightly compacted that the Frenchmen did not have the room necessary to wield their weapons effectively and defend themselves.  As the fighting raged the Frenchmen’s struggle against the mud began to take its toll as the Frenchmen began to suffer from exhaustion.  To add to their predicament the second line of dismounted men advanced, pushing the exhausted first line onto the English swords.  As the English archers realized the predicament of the French dismounted men-at-arms they dropped their bows and produced axes, maces, hammers, swords and joined the fight.  The lightly armored and swift of foot archers found the exhausted men at arms no match and killed them with ease.  As the rest of the French army watched the slaughter of the first two lines they began to drift away from the battle leaving the survivors to the mercy of the English.  The results of the battle were devastating to the French nobility.  It is estimated that 600 nobles were killed and the French kings’ political support severely weakened.  At the end of the day King Henry met with the French chronicler’s and agree that the battle was an English victory and that the name of the battle would be the Battle of Agincourt.

Why did the French lose the battle?  Why did the French pick such a disadvantageous piece of terrain?  What can the modern Warrior learn from the venerable King Henry?  What lessons can be learned from this ancient battle?  The answer to these questions can never be completely answered as there was no single “commander” of the French forces, but we can draw some fairly accurate conclusions.  First the French had an ineffective and almost nonexistent chain of command.  The French King had appointed 2 competent and accomplished career soldiers to command his army but they lacked the authority to issue binding orders to the “princes of blood” who joined the army at Agincourt.  To compound the commander’s problem the units the princes commanded were organized, equipped, paid and subsequently more loyal to their local prince then the distant King.  Some of the units did not join the French army till the morning of the battle.  This did not allow the French to develop any cohesion.  This with the poorly developed chain of command made command and control of the French army almost impossible.  The English on the other hand had been recruited and fighting together for approximately 3 months.  The cohesion developed by the English army cannot be over stated in contributing to the victory at Agincourt.  The French appeared to pick the terrain they subsequently fought on because it was open and allowed the French mounted units access to the English rear.  Why the French allowed the English to redeploy unmolested may never be known, but the only conclusion that can be drawn is the French suffered from overconfidence because of the disparity in number between the 2 armies. 

What can we learn from King Henry’s conduct of the battle?  King Henry was a Warrior.  He had learned his trade well.  He was ruthless, cunning and focused.  King Henry recalled his military history (the battles of Battles of Falkirk and Bannockburn) and adapted those lessons learned to the situation he found himself in.  His planned maximized his strengths (the firepower of his longbow men) and minimized his weaknesses (the relatively small size of his army).  King Henry led by example.  He asked nothing of his soldiers he did not ask from himself.  Most importantly King Henry was a professional, a leader who knew his men, knew warfare, and knew himself.


Further reading:
         Hibbert, Christopher – Agincourt, Cooper Square Press, 2000
Bennett, Matthew – Agincourt 1415: Triumph against the odds, Reed Consumer Books Ltd, 1994
         Keegan, John – The Face of Battle, Penguin Books, 1978