Red Clover

Wednesday, 13 January
Tehran, Iran

“can we accomplish this?”
         The question was uttered softly, barely above a sibilant whisper, by the short, dark skinned man sitting in a large padded chair at the head, but it fell across the long conference table like a dark shadow on a sunny day. There was no response from any of the six men sitting near him along the sides of the table, all wearing unusually dark suits. Instead, they swivelled on their seats, to stare at the eighth man in a chair set apart at the other end.
         He was slightly younger than the others , but despite the similarity in dress, his physical separation from them marked him out as a supplicant. For a few moments he didn’t reply, but stared at the papers laid out on the table in front of him.
         “We have a very narrow window of opportunity,” he said eventually, “but the crucial factor is that we will only get this one chance. If the British and the Americans do succeed in creating the technology they have announce, we will never have this chance again.”
         “That was not the question I asked you, Asghar Okhovat. Kindly confine yourself to matters of fact. I myself will decide on the strategy.”
         Okhovat flushed slightly. “I’m sorry, sir. Yes, I believe we have sufficient intelligence and military power to achieve this.”
         “Asghar is, I suggest, being over-optimistic, and he seems strangely ill-informed about certain aspects of our technological development.” The speaker – Atash Oveisi – was sitting right next to the man at the head of the table. “In particular, he appears unaware that our nuclear devices have a very limited area of development within our own country, and if we begin to expand those areas, the west will become alert. We have already been harassed by the UN to allow inspectors into Qom. So how, does he intend to create such a weapon that will be sufficient enough to carry out our demands?”
         Seven impassive faces stared down the length of the table.
         “We do not need to build a weapon.” Okhovat explained quickly.
         “And how do propose to achieve our objective, by not using weaponry? Our goal is only achievable if we use military power. And if we begin to stock up on supplies of tanks, and artillery at bases, the west will see us. Do not forget that their satellites are flying over us all the time. Their analysts will scrutinise our movements.”
         “strangely enough sir, I am counting on that.”
         “Explain.” The man at the end of the table hissed.
         That didn’t take long. Okhovat had rehearsed his presentation more than a dozen times, and had pared it down to the complete minimum necessary to explain precisely what his scheme entailed.
         When he’d finished, Atash Oveisi was the first to speak. “If I understand correctly, then you intend to use billions of Rial and use all of our uranium supplies to achieve this......, conjuring trick you have perceived.
         “But if it works,” Okhovat replied, “it will be well worth it.”
         “I agree.” Again the words were barely more than a whisper. “But there seems to be an aspect you have forgotten.” Oveisi wasn’t going to let Okhovat off the hook so easily. The younger man was the head of MOIS, Iran’s secret intelligence service which had a reputation of being hopelessly inaccurate. Though had changed in the past few years, and now MOIS was a much more respected agency.
         “Suppose this scheme of yours works, Asghar.” Oveisi said. “Suppose you do persuade the Americans to believe that we are what you propose. How do you think they will react?”
         “They’ll probably discuss it, and then agree. Although there may be a complication with us sounding slightly......... changed. Something they don’t believe in.”
         “I don’t think those words are appropriate. They obviously will investigate further into the case. We will sound desperate to regain trust. And then when you propose to overtake their duties in Iraq, they will suspect something.”
         Okhovat had expected opposition to his plan, but he hadn’t anticipated the direction from where it was coming. He’d thought his most difficult job would be trying to convince the leader himself; yet that individual seemed to favour the plan, whereas Atash Oveisi appeared most opposed to it.
         Oveisi was the deputy leader of the Reformist party of Iran, and Deputy chairman of the Iranian Defence Commission – effectively second in command of the whole country – and a man who quite literally held power over life and death of practically every citizen of Iran. Okhovat had once seen Oveisi use that power, and it had frightened him all the more of the quiet, casual, indifferent manner Oveisi had adopted for its implementation.
         “I think the Americans and British would tread carefully, sir, for several reasons,” Okhovat suggested. “If convinced that we had changed, they would relax, I think very much so. They would not risk finally jeopardising negotiations with us to hold down our armoury. We could destabilise them beyond recognition. They are cowards underneath. And when they finally do find out what we are doing, they will realise, that we will become the next great nation of the earth. The great superpower. Whatever you want to call it.”
         Okhovat was pleased with his analogy, and he hoped that it would appeal to both senior men at the table, of which the President was known to have a fondness of old American style films.
         “And what if we are faced with a war. What if the west comes trooping in, the great cavalry of the world?”
         “That would be a problem,” Okhovat admitted. “But then our partners from the north, will be able to assist us, as I think we are heading for a nice relationship with them.”
         “Yes. But as your plan states, we must regain trust. The only way of doing that is if we let inspectors into Qom. What if our guests discover something?”
         “That will be up to you to decide, sir.”
         “Very well. Now, can I ask how do you propose to strike such a relationship with our friends?”
         The seven men listened intently as Okhovat outlined the details of his strategy he’d spent the last month devising. When he’d finished speaking, even Atash Oveisi looked stunned, so Okhovat wondered if he’d overreached himself. But the man heading the table appeared unfazed by the sheer enormity of the course of action. Instead, he seemed concerned only with the details of the scheme.
         “You’ve proposed a very tight schedule. Next month did you say? And also an enormous amount of Rial. Can you guarantee that within the time scale and unlimited supplies, you can strike this operation for execution in at least one month?”
         “With a fair chance, sir, yes.”
         “What type of funding?”
         “As I said, large funds.”
         “You seem unrealistic, Asghar.” Oveisi growled.
“Why would that be?”
“Well, the cost-“
“-Would not be as much as you expect.” Okhovat finished the sentence. “Although we are making allies, we would be able to pay for production in counterfeit currency, changing it into the appropriate type. I expect this would cut costs  by twenty to thirty percent.”
         “Very well.” The leader sat back. “Does anyone have any further questions?” he asked softly, after a few moments silence. Nobody responded. “We will go ahead.” He turned to another man sitting near him. “Draft a publicity statement saying that we intend to let nuclear inspectors into the Qom facility. Also send a letter to the IAEA confirming the decision.”




BBC Breakfast,
BBC News Channel

“Iran has at last given way to the immense levels of security it has bolted up for protection of its atomic programme. Just a few hours ago, the Iranian Government, here in Tehran, announced that it would be allowing a team from the International Atomic Energy Association; the UN’s nuclear watchdog, into Iran’s most secretive facility, at Qom, in the northern part of the country. This is a landmark announcement, since Iranian officials have never actually allowed any International Security teams into the former Iranian Revolutionary Guard base. The base, has been under much scrutiny in the past few years, due to the fact that barely anything was known about it. This revelation has been confirmed by both Tehran, and the United Nations. It is expected that Washington and London will be releasing statements soon. This comes straight after the previous announcement by President Amjad Kunar that stated that Iran stands by its release that it does not have a nuclear weapons programme, or any scheduled operations to create one. Of course, sceptics have dismissed this, even comparing it to the Iraq war, where Saddam Hussein was thought to have beheld weapons of mass destruction. However our newly elected Prime Minister; Robert Smith, has said that he will not make the same mistake as his predecessor, and will not invade without cause. He may not have a reason to even think about such a decision, if the report that will follow the IAEA inspection confirms that Iran does not have any desire to create a nuclear warhead. But when I and my BBC crew approached President Kunar, we were pushed back by security forces. This may suggest that he is under increased security, but may be perfectly normal. Though we can rest assured, that within the next month or so, nuclear inspectors will be in Qom. This is Lorna Hewitt, in Tehran, for BBC News.