Policy Implementation Complexities

POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND POLITICAL COMPLEXTIES



Policy implementation is becoming a science in and of itself. The old days of shooting from the hip in a wild barrage of well-meant but often inefficient policy and procedure implementation is going by the roadside and in its place comes the standard practice of study as a prelude to action. Meltsner (1972). From the ashes emerges the Policy Analyst. That quiet, steely eyed individual with guns slung low who has trained in the science of policy analysis and who, with selfless abandon, can determine the political feasibility of any policy; he studies support goals and values of the current political arena and can determine the best plan of action for the institution of his employ. He’s a man who knows no fear, is unaffected by his environment; he faces his opposition with reckless disregard to his own wellbeing, and stands for what he knows to be true come hell or high water. He’s a problem solver; He is - in truth - a myth. There is no such thing.  Russo (2012).

The notion that any one factor or one person can determine the outcome of success concerning policy implementation is like saying that any one thing is responsible for the turning of the earth; “It’s just gravity” falls way short of satisfactorily explaining the phenomena of the moon and earth’s gravitational pull on one another just as “the analyst isn’t competent to find the problem” doesn’t cover the complexities of policy implementation.  The truth is that policy implementation is affected by many factors and there is no way to pinpoint what THE problem is because there are several.  There is however, some evidence of that our steely eyed gunslinger does exist to an extent and in some instances. Though he is not a policy analyst, he is vital to the implementation of policy in a political environment; he is, as we will soon see, a “dirty minded” individual. Levin (1986).

Several factors emerge from the literature that point to common policy implementation issues. Of those several four truly stand out as repeating themes of implementation failure and it is those four areas which I plan to examine in detail in this literature review. The first of the four themes most common was the inability of policy analysts to take into account the political feasibility of their proposed policy.  These devout practitioners of the Pressman-Wildavsky Paradox  often found disappointment in their often untested or untestable assumptions in the event that they didn’t weigh in environmental and political factors for support. Alexander (1989)

Secondly there appears to be an opportunity that has to be captured when the time is right. The environment and timing of policy implementation is crucial to effective policy implementation, third is the authority to actually change policy, coupled with political support, and last seems to be the planning and preparation of the policy to be implemented, the “dirty mindedness” of the matter if you will.



We don’t give credit to the importance of politics in the implementation of policy, and political scientists have failed to provide a framework for assessing the political feasibility of policy proposals, and consequently, even those analysts who are trained political scientists are more capable of formulating statistical and economical concepts of feasibility than they are at determining political factors.  Webber (1986). The literature seems to embrace the tangible as opposed to the somewhat mystical aspect of human behavior in political thought.

The implications drawn from some of these models are the product of mathematical and numerical assumptions and are relatively arbitrary and untested. Not being based on any observation, they seem at best to be the product of intuitive introspection, and they offer no empirical answers to the question of implementation success. Some have even been said that this probabilistic analysis can distort many real world, multi-actor situations.  [Alexander (1989); O’Toole (1986)].

According to Greenberg, if policy analysts hope to see any use made of their work, they must tend to the political problems of implementation, not just the technical. Greenberg (1976)

Before the analyst can link political aspects and reactions together, he must understand his political environment. The very nature of policy change forces actors to take sides, and those who are pro and con for the change become apparent. Change invites controversy, especially for those who are going to be impacted the most by the change.  [Meltsner (1972), Rose (1977)]. Not recognizing this can and will jeopardize the effective implementation of policy. Not preparing will ensure that the policy change will never get off of the ground.

Though policy analysis has become prominent over the past several decades, there is virtually no scholarly work on the analysis of the political feasibility of policy proposals and political scientists should be making an effort to educate policy analysts about the political limits of their proposals. One author pointed out that only one of the numerous scholarly articles that he researched to submit his work, only one discussion of a utilization attempt was recorded, and that available literature didn’t make any effort to give those in the policy process any framework for policy implementation. [ Webber (1986); O’Toole (1986)].

Reviews of federal social programs suggest that such programs must be altered to fit the constraints of the local political system if they will be successfully started at all.  Sabatier (1979) No agency wants to die, and like growth, organizational decline and death is a form of organizational change. Unfortunately, that change is often reflected in the presence of budgetary concerns, and the choice usually involves a tradeoff between equity and efficiency. Levine (1986). Thus the political aspect of change must be taken into account otherwise the pen and paper aspects of perceived implementation effects fall short.

Active political support is necessary in order for the implementing officials to survive the barrage of constituent complaints and to overcome the resistance inherent to change and it is important that implementation be assigned to agencies whose policy orientation is consistent with the statute and which will accord the new program high priority and to welcome outsiders to participate in the implementation of new policy and to evaluate the effectiveness of same. Sabatier (1979)

Consideration of implementation during the design of policy explicitly introduces the question of how implementation of a policy will affect existing patterns of bureaucratic power and structure. O’Toole (1986)

Many programs are defeated before they even get started because of managers’ inability to show a constituency how the program functions within their best interest. Levin (1986).

There is no function more political than that of convincing a group that you are acting within their best interest, and no challenge more great than getting them to believe it.



According to John Kingdon (1984, p. 74), successful proposals take advantage of “policy” windows, the opportunity for action for action on given initiatives (that) present themselves and stay open for only short periods… If the participants cannot or do not take advantage of thos opportunities, they must bide their time until the next opportunity comes along. A policy implementation is also more likely to be successful if it is an outgrowth or modification of an existing policy or previous policy proposal. Webber (1986).

A policy analyst can investigate the political implications that his work will create and he needs to do so by first specifying his policy problem’s relevant environment, and then gathering political information, and making judgments based on the findings.  Webber (1986) In other words, he must figure out when and where this policy can and will be implemented, who will oppose it, who will support it, and what time window will be open to allow it to take place.  September 11, 2001 was a perfect time window to establish a multitude of new national policies. Federal Air Marshals for instance would never have been seen as favorable in the public eye until that national tragedy had taken place.  The Department of Homeland Security, on the same token, would probably have been seen as both unnecessary and yet another example of government bureaucracy that was designed simply to waste the taxpayers money. As it was the window was open and several restricting policies were not only implemented, they were embraced.

Robert T. Nakamura , referring to the research of Richard Elmore, claims that in regards to “systems changing instruments, the central problem is how to keep the existing institutional interests and arrangements from driving new ones out of existence until the new ones have a chance to form. Namura (1991). We saw that with the Air Marshal program, a great idea when implemented, and necessary in my opinion, but not given a chance to survive on the level it was implemented because of the inability to measure the success of the program. Granted there were no more hijackings but who was to say that was a result of Air Marshals on planes and not strictly the efforts of the FBI, CIA, and DHS. As Sabatier puts it:

“Target compliance and the costs involved in obtaining it may be wasted if not correctly linked to the desired state, and compliance is likely to be resented and the political support declined if there are not at least estimates of success.” -- Sabatier (1979).

Not being able to pinpoint what exactly success is, has led to a lot of disagreement about what is worth supporting. And also for every principle it seems that one can find an equally plausible and acceptable counter principle. O’Toole (1986)

Any evaluation system must be based of articulable goals that can be related to set outputs. Greenberg (1976)

Statutes can only go so far in ensuring a policy’s implemented, there must be additional conditions fulfilled in order for the policy to have it’s full objectives met. They must be modified to fit their unique political and geographical environment.  There is some evidence that political feedback is based more on the policy perception of the affected group than on actual empirical evidence of those statutes. Sabatier (1979).

There is no reason to think that policy actors can, do, or should make decisions based simply on research findings, they must take the environment and time of the policy proposal into account as well. O’Toole (1986)

According to David Greenberg, “traditional process indicators are frequently meaningless in terms of the needs of the client population and, indeed, often establish incentives and behavior that are incompatible with program goals.  If benefit cost analysis is going to establish criteria for measuring performance, then those criteria should be reflected in the internal incentive structure of the project.” Greenberg (1976) In other words, the ends should justify the means. Or, as Berman states:

The key variables to policy implementation then is the timeliness of the new policy being implemented, and the “ideological” consistency of the policy. Berman (1992)

Hitting that policy window when it’s there.



In order for policy implementation to be effective, especially in light of rigid resistance, the literature supports my claim that a strong executive has to be in charge of implementing that change and seeing it through. He must have the political support and backing of those above him, and he must be able to face political adversity.

In the Phol Brothers case mentioned later in this review, the vast majority of the possibly responsible persons dodged the meeting entirely and thusly avoided any involvement. Nakamura (1991)

“Two obvious design features stand out: a poor choice of implementers and a failure to build a fixer role.” The agency was not totally committed or equipped - I might add – to making the policy work. Nakamura (1991)

To get the job done, the amount of change required in a target groups behavior, the orientation of those groups, and the diversity of the assigned activities of the groups must all be taken into account and directed accordingly. When dealing with members of the civil service, the resistance to change is somewhat more intensive simply because the protections allocated to civil servants is that much more so than to the public, or non classified employees.  Sabatier (1979)

Implementing officials cannot be trusted to adequately act in a manner consistent with regulatory regulations, they must be overseen; what is needed, according to Martin Levin, is a “fixer.” Levin (1986)

This fixer is the steely eyed gunslinger to which I eluded in my introduction. It takes a fixer to create a paradigm shift, and to especially create a paradigm shift in a civil service environment.  According to Levin, his research uncovered empirical evidence that successful policy programs had, at the core, an executive who acted as a fixer; a person responsible for repairing the implementation process and protecting their programs through coalition building and intervention in administrative details.

This is evident in the Levin study of the Youth Employment Programs of the 1970’s, a successful implementation of policy that was built on an established framework, and which used “fixers” to see the policy through to fruition. Levin (1986)

Two fixers who really stand out to me are both Miami University of Ohio graduates. The first, William H. Dallman, graduated from Miami with a degree in psychology and went on to quickly become the warden of the Lebanon Correctional Institution in southwestern Ohio. In 1969, Bill Dallman, an institution pscychologist, nearly single-handedly quelled a riot that kicked off on a Summer evening. Thinking quickly, Dallman grabbed a shotgun and a bandolier of ammunition. Amidst the shrieking sirens and panicking administrators who were scurrying about, he recruited one more person and together the two took back the central corridor with a hale of gunfire. After being made warden, Dallman even left a cellblock door standing marked with buckshot, as a clear message to inmates as to how a riot would be responded to at his prison.  He was lauded for his bravery, quickly promoted, and he then created a constituency both at his institution and in the central administrative offices in Columbus, often getting away with things that no other warden or any state official could achieve based strictly on sheer political power. His civil servant employees quickly developed his attitudes and beliefs and for thirty years, Bill Dallman was king at Lebanon.  Upon his retirement the state was faced with a dilemma. They had an institution full of employees who were civil service, had certain rights and protections that could not be denied, and who had – under Dallmans’ leadership – fairly snubbed their nosed at many of the state regulations and statues that had developed over the years; in fact, for a period of time, every young recruit passing through the halls of  the Corrections Training Academy in Orient, Ohio was told that there are three ways of doing things in Ohio corrections; “the right way, the wrong way, and the Lebanon way.” The old standard was strong. The men and women running the prison had all been hand selected by Bill Dallman. They were all well versed in policy rights and civil service law. Most were still loyal to Dallman and would be resistant to any change than any man tried to bring to them. Most still carried pocket knives into the prison, something that Dallman allowed even though there was pressure from Columbus to stop and every other institution in the state, there were 32 at the time, had stopped several years earlier.  They found their answer in Harry K. Russell.  H.K. Russell was a political scientist from Miami University who had worked in the system for about as long as Bill Dallman had. He knew Dallman’s reputation as did every other employee of DR&C, the man was a legend, and he came in the door quietly with the intention, it seemed, to win the hearts and minds of the people who were established there. The problem was that no one was afraid of Harry Russell, and the first few months of his appointment resulted in three attempted escapes and two successful ones as inmates Rex Elam and Robert Michael climbed the fence right under the nose of an inattentive guard and escaped off into the night only being discovered missing the next day after having made it through no less than three required standing counts. The result was instantaneous, H.K. Russell became a fixer.  The first thing he did was write every member of his command staff up for inattention to duties whether they had been there the week of the escapes or not. He saw the problem as a deeply rooted and long standing one and he had to change the political environment quickly. The fear that Dallman would kill them had kept many of the inmates in check and since that fear was gone, the inadequacies of Lebanon’s security policies were beginning to show through.  So H.K fired some people, forced others into retirement, changed command structure, made enemies, and got the institution caught up to where it needed to be. He did so with the full support of Central Office, and he was very effective. 

This example, I think, supports the claims made by Levin, quoted above, and Elmore when he wrote:  “Neither administrators nor policy analysts are very comfortable with the possibility that most of what happens in the implementation process cannot be explained by the intentions and directions of policymakers” Elmore (1977) To wit: the breaking of a former political constituency, and the “dirty minded” thinking that Levin refers to when he talks of the ability to “anticipate and predict implementation difficulties and to be attuned to conflicting interests and their likelihood of delaying, even outright resisting, implementation. Levin (1986)

This supports my claim that there needs to be an authoritative figure to take the helm of policy implementation, and that individual has to have the political backing to be effective.



Finally, the literature claims that planning and good thought to implementation is a common factor of policy implementation success.

Political options must be weighed carefully and planned accordingly even if there seems to be an easy choice amongst existing options.  In some policy implementation situations, individuals and corporations can often find themselves being looked upon as common criminals – hazardous waste cleanup for instance – and their only concern in those instances is going to be the bottom line.  Alternative dispute resolution, ADR, was devised for just such occasions as the above mentioned.  Encouraging the possibly responsible parties, PRPs, to seek a means to an end that did not involve costly litigation. This program sought a voluntary remedial action between those PRPs , so that the problem could be solved and costs could be held down to a minimum. Nakamura (1991).  According to Nakamura, a classic case of a failure by an ADR took place in New York at the Phohl Brothers Landfill in the 1970’s. An accumulation of PRPs were contacted and asked to participate in an ADR to resolve the issue of hazardous waste cleanup that they were all responsible for. Only a few responded, those that did were fearful of reprisal while others “hid in the weeds”, and the entire program failed miserably because the decision that produced the promising plan of voluntary remedial action was gained on a basis that was unrealistic and which gave each PRP an opportunity to misallocate their energies and underestimate their own responsibilities. The policymakers and implementers did not invest the effort that would have made the plan work; they didn’t have any teeth, to coin a phrase. Nakamura (1991).  The plan was not based on an established previous endeavor but was instead one of those seat of the pants efforts that fell apart due to its lack of planning.

The Pohl Brothers endeavor lost ground from the beginning because the policymakers involved failed to critically understand the promises and successes of ADR techniques from other successful projects, and they did not perform a careful assessment of what would be need in their specific situation, poor planning in other words. Nakamura (1991)

The success or failure of implantation of a policy is linked to planning and organizational design. Alexander (1989)

The YEDPA system was successful because of many factors, they didn’t start from scratch, rather they used a formulated and successful program and were able to forsee pitfalls, furthermore, they had internal spot checks that detected and correction implementation problems as they arose, and lastly they had a plan B that could take effect in the event of failure if the initial implementation. Levin (1986)

“Modest straightforward program designs also seem to be replicable as are modest program goals… such modest designs and goals are especially important because average executives can carry them out.” Levin (1986)



In the few case studies where implementation is examined, authors are careful not to generalize more than a step or two beyond their data, and their advice is often strategically vague. Elmore (1987) This makes sense because political feasibility is not an exact science. Part psychology and part intuition, true political savvy is a gift like the ability to count cards or enjoy a photographic memory. There is no school which turns out Nucky Johnsons, no class that can teach the ability to press the flesh.

The conclusion of my fourth point of contention can be summed up, I think, by Lawrence O’Toole:

“…the typical situation in implementation research, even more so than for other types of social science, has been for there to be very little conscious effort to develop and test, systematically, the insights generated in previous work, and thus to separate the promising from the merely plausible but unproductive.” O’Toole (1986)



In summary, the literature seems to reflect the arguments that I have put forth here.  Where I make the claim that four factors which are recurring themes in policy implementation and political complexities literature are as follows:

1.          Disregarding the political aspect of policy change, or not taking political factors into account when considering  policy implementation and change. 

2.          Missing the window of opportunity, or not attempting to implement policy at the proper time.

3.          Not having the authority and political support to change the policy.(A fixer)

4.          Not having the proper planning and research to guarantee policy implementation success.

The literature makes very similar claims in the analysis of policy implementation success and failure.  According to Paul Sabatier a policy that is departed from the status quo will only be successful under these circumstances:

1.          The program is based on a sound theory relating changes in target group behavior to the achievement of the desired end state. (Number 4 above)

2.          The statute, or other policy decision, contains unambiguous policy directives and structures the implementation process so as to maximize the likelihood that target groups will perform as desired. (3 and 4 above)

3.          The leaders of the implementing agencies possess substantial management skills and political skills, and are committed to statutory goals. ( 3 above)

4.          The program is actively supported by organized constituency groups and by a few key legislators (or the chief executive) throughout the implementation process, with the courts being neutral or supportive. ( 1 above)

5.          The relative priority of statutory objectives is not significantly undermined over time by the emergence og conflicting public policies or by changes in relevant socioeconomic conditions that undermine the statutes “technical” theory or political support.  – Sabatier (1979)



Also, according to Laurence O’Toole:

1.          Design policies to keep the degree of required behavioral change low. (Political feasibility)

2.          Simplify the structure of implementation and minimize the number of actors. (Planning, keeping it simple).

3.          Seek more consideration of the problems of implementation during the initial stages of policy formation. (Planning, finding the open window).

4.          Take care to leave the responsibilities of implementation among units sympathetic to the policy. (Political authority, setting a fixer).





































SABATIER, PAUL, The Conditions of Effective Implementation: A Guide to Accomplishing Policy     

Objectives, Policy Analysis, 5:4(1979:Fall)p.481-504



RUSSO, PHILLIP. (2012, 1). Policy Analysis Lecture, Miami University, Oxford, OH.



ALEXANDER, ERNEST R., The Pressman-Wildvasky Paradox Revisited, Journal of Public Policy,       

9:2 (Oct.-Dec., 1989). pp. 451-465



WEBBER, DAVID J., Analyzing Political Feasibility: Political Scientists’ Unique Contribution to Policy Analysis, Policy Studies Journal, 14:4 (16: June 1986) pp. 545-553



NAKAMURA, ROBERT T., et al., Environmental dispute Resolution and Hazardous Waste Cleanups:A Cautionary Tale of Policy Implementation, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 10:2 (1991: Spring) pp.204-221



O’TOOLE, LAWRENCE J. Jr., Policy Recommendations for Multi-Actor Implementation: An assessment of the Field, Journal of Public Policy, 6:2 (Apr. – Jun. 1986) pp. 181-210



GREENBERG, DAVID, Technical Success, Political Failure: The Incentive Pay Plan for California Job Agents, Policy Analysis, 2:4 (1976:Fall) pp.545-575



LEVIN, MARTIN, et al., The Political Hand: Policy Implementation and Youth Employment Programs, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 5:2 (1986:Winter) pp. 311-325



BERMAN, EVAN M., The Politics of Federal Technology Policy: 1980-1988, Policy Studies Review, 10:4 (1991-92:Winter) pp. 28-41



ROSE, RICHARD, Implementation and Evaporation: The Record of MBO, Public Administration Review, (Jan.-Feb. 1977) pp.71



ELMORE, RICHARD F., Backward Mapping: Implementation Research and Policy Decisions, Political Science Quarterly, 94:4 (1977:Winter) pp. 601-614



MELTSNER, ARNOLD J., Political Feasibility and Policy Analysis, Public Administration Review, (Nov.-Dec. 1972) pp. 859-867



KINGDON, JOHN W. (1984) Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. Boston: Little, Brown,

and Co.



ELMORE, RICHARD, Instruments and Strategy in Public Choice, Public Policy Review 7:1 (1987) pp. 174-186